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Abstract
A jurisdiction of the Indonesian Constitutional Court concerning 
constitutional adjudication is only limited to review the constitutionality of 
national law. There is no mechanism for challenging any decision or action made 
by public authorities that violate fundamental rights enshrined in the Indonesian 
Constitution. This article argues that constitutional complaint and constitutional 
question might be adopted as new jurisdictions of the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court in order to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights of its citizen. 
It also identifies main problems that will be faced by the Constitutional Court in 
exercising constitutional complaint and constitutional question. For instance, the 
Court will be burdened with too many cases as experienced by other countries. 
A clear mechanism for filtering applications lodged to the Constitutional Court 
and the time limit for deciding cases are important elements that have to be 
regulated to overcome the problems. In addition, the institutional structure of 
the Constitutional Court has to be improved, particularly to support its decision-
making process.
Keywords: Constitutional Complaint, Constitutional Court, Constitutional 
Question, Fundamental Rights, Individual Application.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
One of the main agendas from constitutional reform in Indonesia that 
occurred from 1999 to 2002 is to strengthen the protection and promotion of 
human rights. The result of constitutional amendments has incorporated a specific 
chapter concerning constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms 
which were adopted from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various 
international covenants. An effort to enforce those human rights is carried out 
by establishing several state institutions, particularly the Constitutional Court 
as a separate and independent court from the Supreme Court.
The Indonesian Constitutional Court is granted several constitutional 
powers, namely: (1) to review constitutionality of law; (2) to decide disputes 
concerning the authorities of state institutions whose powers are derived from 
the Constitution; (3) to decide matters concerning dissolution of political 
parties; (4) to decide disputes over the result of general elections; (5) to decide 
legal matters concerning impeachment process of the President and/or the Vice 
President. At the time of writing, the Constitutional Court has decided 3,519 
cases with detailed statistics as follows.
Figure 1
Statistics of the Constitutional Court Decisions
 (August 2003 – April 2016)
Type of
Jurisdiction
Total
Decision
Grant-
ed
Re-
jected
Inad-
missible
With-
drawn
Injuc-
tion
Dis-
missed
Constitu-
tional
Review
815 187 280 261 87 - -
Dispute of 
State
Institution
25 1 3 17 4 - -
Legislative 
Election
1,826 (is-
sues) 120 1,224 400 44 38
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Type of
Jurisdiction
Total
Decision
Grant-
ed
Re-
jected
Inad-
missible
With-
drawn
Injuc-
tion
Dis-
missed
Presidential 
Election 4 - 4 - - - -
Local
Election 849 73 459 288 26 3
Dissolution 
of Political 
Party
- - - - - - -
Impeach-
ment - - - - - - -
Source: Website of the Indonesian Constitutional Court
Mechanism of constitutional review in the Constitutional Court is the most 
frequent legal remedy used by justice seekers to protect their fundamental 
rights. The legality of a part or an entire law that is contrary to the Indonesian 
Constitution can be annulled by the Constitutional Court. However, constitutional 
review in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is only limited to national law, 
not other types of laws or decisions. From the perspective of constitutional 
government, it is believed that the current jurisdiction of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court cannot optimally protect fundamental rights of its citizens. 
There is no direct mechanism available to the Court when citizens feel their 
fundamental rights have been violated by decisions, policies or actions made by 
public authorities or state institutions. In addition, the Indonesian constitutional 
adjudication system does not provide a mechanism for ordinary judges to ask 
the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of laws or regulations 
being used as the basis for examining their cases.
Based on a comparative study of constitutional courts from different countries, 
the two mechanisms explained above are known as constitutional complaint and 
constitutional question. What are the characteristic of constitutional complaint 
and constitutional question cases? How can constitutional complaint and 
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constitutional question be adopted as the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction? This article will investigate what constitutional complaint and 
constitutional question are and how the mechanisms could be adopted into the 
constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. It will also highlight several 
aspects that should be considered seriously if these mechanisms are to be 
adopted by the Indonesian Constitutional Court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Constitutional Complaint
Constitutional complaint provides one of the major powers of constitutional 
courts to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. It is defined as a complaint 
to a constitutional court, lodged by individuals who feel their fundamental 
or constitutional rights are being violated by public authorities.1 In some 
circumstances, municipalities or associations of municipalities, on the basis 
of their right to self-government, may also lodge a constitutional complaint.2 
Dannemann suggests that constitutional complaint has several characteristics 
determined by four factors: (1) availability of legal remedies against violations 
of constitutional rights; (2) existence of a separate process that only examines 
constitutional issues of an act, not other legal issues; (3) it can be submitted by 
individuals who are directly affected by that act; and (4) the court that decides 
a constitutional complaint has a power to restore the rights of victims.3
The constitutional complaint can only be accepted by a constitutional court 
if all available legal remedies have been carried out or exhausted through the 
judicial process. In addition, all possibilities to correct or prevent violations of 
the Constitution must be used. This requirement is also identified as subsidiarity 
of the constitutional complaint.4 In some countries, the constitutional complaint 
can be directed towards an act of public authority, the constitutionality of laws 
1  Victor Ferreres Comella, “The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts on Judicial 
Activism”, Texas Law Review, Volume 82, Issue 7, June 2004, p. 710.
2  Article 93(1)(4b) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
3  Gerhard Dannemann, “Constitutional Complaints: The European Perspective”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
Volume 43, Issue 1, January 1994, p. 142.
4  See The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Constitutional Complaint, http://www.bundesverfassungs gericht.de/EN/Verfahren/
Wichtige-Verfahrensarten/Verfassungsbeschwerde/verfassungsbeschwerde_node. html, accessed 8 March 2016.
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or court decisions.5 The constitutional court only examines the conformity of an 
act against the Constitution, while the assessment of legal issues and other facts 
remain the authority of ordinary courts. As long as no violation of fundamental 
rights or constitutional rights occurs, the constitutional court is bound by 
decisions of ordinary courts. 6
A study conducted by the Venice Commission in 2010 concerning the efficiency 
of individual complaint procedures in over fifty countries concluded that there are 
two types of individual access, namely: (1) a normative constitutional complaint 
that allows the individual to file a complaint on the violation of fundamental 
rights based on the unconstitutionality of a law; and (2) a full constitutional 
complaint that allows the individual to file a complaint on the violation of 
fundamental rights not only based on the unconstitutionality of law, but also an 
unconstitutional decision made by other ordinary courts and the Supreme Court.7
Constitutional Court power to examine constitutional complaint cases 
exists in many countries. This power is also known by different terms. For 
instance, in Western Europe, the Austrian Constitutional Court uses the original 
term of Individualbeschwerde,8 the German Constitutional Court knows it as 
Verfassungsbeschwerd9 and the Spanish Constitutional Court refers to this power 
5 Constitutional complaint against decisions of an ordinary court is not intended to review the decisions as a whole, but to examine 
whether the court has violated constitutional law. When there is a fact concerning the presence of a mistake in the process, find-
ings, interpretation or application of a law in individual cases, it cannot be directly interpreted as a violation of fundamental rights. 
See The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Instructions on Lodging a Constitutional Complaint with the Federal Constitutional 
Court, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/_zielgruppeneinstieg/Merkblatt/Merkblatt_node .html;jsessionid=2
C026E2CDFCF7EA417D663C5E084D94C.2_cid361, accessed 8 March 2016.
6 I Dewa Gede Palguna, Pengaduan Konstitusional (Constitutional Complaint) sebagai Upaya Hukum Perlindungan Hak-Hak Konstitu-
sional Warga Negara: Studi Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia dengan Rujukan Amerika Serikat, Republik Federal 
Jerman, dan Korea Selatan sebagai Perbandingan [Constitutional Complaint: Legal Remedy of Protection of Citizen’s Constitutional 
Rights: A Study on the Indonesia’s Constitutional Court Competence in a Comparative Perspective], Doctoral Thesis, The University 
of Indonesia, 2011, p. 1.
7 Gianni Buquicchio, “Constitutional Complaint as an Instrument for Protecting Fundamental Rights of Citizen” in M. Guntur Hamzah 
et al. (eds), Proceeding of International Symposium on Constitutional Complaint, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 
2015, pp. 168-169.
8 Article 139, Article 140 and Article 144 of the Austrian Constitution and § 82 of the Austrian Constitutional Court Law. The Austrian 
model of constitutional complaint does not allow to challenge a court decision before the Constitutional Court although the court’s 
decision is alleged to violate fundamental rights. However, this mechanism is being studied to be improved and has been included 
in the constitutional reform draft. See Anna Gamper and Francesco Palermo, “The Constitutional Court of Austria: Modern Profiles 
of an Archetype of Constitutional Review” in Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study, 
London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2009, pp. 44-45.
9 Article 93(1)(4a) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and §§ 90 et seq. of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court Law. See also Donald P. Kommers and Russell A. Miller, “Da Bundesverfassungsgericht: Procedure, Practice and Policy of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court” in Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study, 
London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2009, pp. 112-113. 
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as recurso de amparo.10 A constitutional complaint mechanism is also practiced 
in Central and Eastern European countries, such as Croatia,11 Czech Republic,12 
Hungary,13 Poland,14 Russia15 and Ukraine.16
In Asia, several constitutional courts hold a power to examine constitutional 
complaint cases, such as in Azerbaijan,17 South Korea,18 Thailand19 and Turkey.20 
Furthermore, many constitutional courts in Latin America have similar power 
to constitutional complaint known as juicio de amparo or writ of amparo, for 
10 Article 53(2) of the Spanish Constitution and Article 41 to Article 47 and Article 50 of the Spanish Constitutional Court Law. See 
also Victor Ferreres Comella, “The Spanish Constitutional Court: Time for Reforms” in Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), 
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study, London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2009, pp. 182-183. 
11  Article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia; Article 62 to Article 80 of the Constitutional Court Law of the Republic 
of Croatia; and Article 24 to Article 25 and Article 80 to Article 82 of the Rule of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia. Further discussion on constitutional complaint cases in Croatia, see Dragana Bjelić and Mirela Mezak Stastny, 
“Constitutional Complaint as an Instrument of Fulfilling the Worker’s Rights in Croatian Legal System”, International Journal of 
Social, Behavioral, Educational, Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering, Volume 5, Issue 5, 2011, pp. 750-753.
12  Article 87(1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Article 72 to Article 84 of the Constitutional Court Law of the Czech 
Republic. 
13  See Article 24(2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (as enacted on 25 April 2011); Article 26 to Article 31 of the Constitutional 
Court Law of Hungary (2011); and the Decision 1001/2013. (II. 27.) AB Tü. on the Constitutional Court’s Rules of Procedure. Discussion 
on the development of constitutional complaint in Hungary, see Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz, “The Hungarian Constitutional Court in 
Transition - From Actio Popularis to Constitutional Complaint”, Acta Juridica Hungarica, Volume 53, Issue 4, 2012, pp. 302-315.
14  Article 79(1) and Article 188 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland; Article 27 and Article 46 of the Constitutional Tribunal 
Law of the Republic of Poland. Further discussion on constitutional complaint in Poland, see Lech Garlizky, “Constitutional 
Complaint in Poland”, a paper presented at the Conference of the Constitutional Control Organs of the Countries of New Democracy, 
the Constitutional Court of Armenia and the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe, Yerevan, 
24 October 1997.
15  Article 125 (4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 3 of the Federal Constitutional Law of the Constitutional 
Court of Russian Federation. See also Mikhail I. Kleandrov, “Institute of Constitutional Complaint of Citizens at the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation”, in M. Guntur Hamzah et al. (eds), Proceeding of International Symposium on Constitutional 
Complaint, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015, pp. 221-224.
16  Article 150 of the Constitution of Ukraine (as amended by the Law № 2952-VI dated 1 February 2011) and the Law № 586-VII 
dated 10 September 2013; Article 13, Article 42, Article 43, and Article 82 to Article 85 of the Constitutional Court Law of Ukraine 
dated 17 May 2012. A case example of constitutional complaint in Ukraine, see The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, “Decision of 
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the Matter of the Constitutional Petition of Sixty People’s Deputies of Ukraine Regarding 
an Official Interpretation of the Provisions of Article 103.1 of the Constitution of Ukraine in the Context of the Provisions of Its 
Articles 5 and 156, and the Constitutional Complaint of Citizens Vadym Serhiiovych Halaichuk, Viktoria Valentynivna Podhorna, and 
Tetiana Volodymyrivna Kysla Regarding an Official Interpretation of the Provisions of Articles 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 of the Constitution 
of Ukraine (Case of the Exercise of Power by the People)”, Statutes and Decisions, Volume 44, No. 3, May-June 2009, pp. 26–34.
17  Article 130 para V of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (as result of Referendum held on 18 March 2009) and Article 
34 of the Constitutional Court Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
18  Article 111(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Article 68(1) and (2) of the Constitutional Court Law of the Republic 
of Korea. The constitutional complaint becomes a very important power for the Constitutional Court of Korea. See also Tom 
Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 
pp. 206-246.
19  Section 212 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. Further discussion on the Constitutional Court of Thailand, see 
Chalermpon Ake-uru, “Promotion of Democracy and Constitutional Justice: the Case of Thailand”, http://www.aaccei.org/ccourtDo
wn?bbsSeqn=258&fileSeqn=2, accessed 28 February 2016, pp. 6-7; Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, “The Constitutional Courts 
of Thailand and Indonesia: Two Case Studies from South East Asia” in Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), Constitutional 
Courts: A Comparative Study, London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2009, p. 122.
20  Article 148 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (as amended on September 12, 2010; Act No. 5982); Article 45 to 
Article of Law on the Establishment and Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of Turkey (Law No: 6216, adopted 30 
March 2011). The regional position of the Constitutional Court of Turkey is interesting. Turkey is a member of the Conference of 
European Constitutional Court and a member of the Association of Asian Constitutional Court and Equivalent Institution (AACCEI). 
In examining constitutional complaint or individual application cases, the Court uses the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) as its foundation. Further discussion on the constitutional complaint in Turkey, see Hüseyin Ekinci and Musa Sağlam, 
Individual Application to the Turkish Constitutional Court, Ankara: The Constitutional Court of Turkey, 2015; Nazlı Can Ülvan, “Con-
stitutional Complaint and Individual Complaint in Turkey”, Ankara Bar Review, Volume 6, Issue 2, 2013, p. 179-186.
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example Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela.21 Currently, some 
countries, such as France, Italy, Lithuania and Macedonia, lack a constitutional 
complaint mechanism and are working towards developing one to be adopted 
as an additional power in their constitutional courts.22
In Indonesia, the Constitutional Court does not have a power to examine 
constitutional complaint cases. However, in a draft constitutional amendment, 
the Constitutional Commission (Komisi Konstitusi) proposed a constitutional 
complaint mechanism to the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR), suggesting that the Constitutional Court 
should hold a power to examine constitutional complaint cases.23 According 
Palguna, Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court who involved in amending 
the Constitution, there was no further discussion in the MPR concerning this 
issue. The MPR members did not follow up the Constitutional Commission’s 
proposal.24 There is no clear explanation for why the MPR rejected this idea.25 
Neverthelesss, there are several possible reasons to explain the MPR’s stance.
First, to maintain their influence and power, political interests between 
political factions dominated the constitutional amendment process in establishing 
the Constitutional Court. Thus, the amendment process was not predominantly 
led by sound discussions with intent to form a robust constitutional adjudication 
system. Second, the MPR did not want a Constitutional Court with full authority 
to protect fundamental rights or constitutional rights of citizens due to concerns 
21 Discussion on writ of amparo in Latin America, see Gianluca Gentili, “A Comparative Perspective on Direct Access to Constitutional 
and Supreme Courts in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America: Assessing Advantages for the Italian Constitutional Court”, Penn 
State International Law Review, Volume 29, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 710-715.
22 See Otto Pfersmann, “Concrete Review as Indirect Constitutional Complaint in French Constitutional Law: A Comparative Perspec-
tive”, European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst), Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2010, p. 223-248; Gentili, op. cit.; Aušra Kargaudienė, 
“Individual Constitutional Complaint in Lithuania: Conception and the Legal Issues”, Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Volume 4, Issue 
1, January 2011, pp. 154-168; Tanja Karakamisheva, “Constitutional Complaint- Procedural and Legal Instrument for Development 
of the Constitutional Justice (Case Study – Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia and Republic 
of Macedonia)”, a paper presented at the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, the Constitutional Court of South Africa and 
the Venice Commission, Cape Town, 24 January 2009.
23 Hamdan Zoelva, “Pengaduan Konstitusional (Constitutional Complaint) dalam Sistem Peradilan di Indonesia [Constitutional Complaint 
in Judicial System in Indonesia]” Jurnal Negarawan, Volume 16, May 2010), p. 53. The Constitutional Commission was an ad hoc 
body formed by the MPR to conduct a study and give recommendations on the 1945 Constitutional amendment. This Commission 
consisted of experts chaired by Professor Sri Soemantri and supported by Albert Hasibuan (Deputy Chairman I), Isaac Latucon-
sina (Deputy Chairman II), Sri Adiningsih (Secretary), and DR. N.E. Fatima (Deputy Secretary). Unfortunately, recommendations 
submitted by the Constitutional Commission to the MPR were not binding.
24  I Dewa Gede Palguna, “Overcoming Constitutional Obstacles in Dealing with Constitutional Complaint Issues: Indonesia’s Experience” 
in M. Guntur Hamzah et al. (eds), Proceeding of International Symposium on Constitutional Complaint, the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Indonesia, 2015, p. 148.
25  Ibid.
A Prospect and Challenges for Adopting Constitutional Complaint and
Constitutional Question in the Indonesian Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, May 2016, Volume 2, Number 1110
that the Court would examine the human right violations committed during 
the New Order. 
Third, the MPR considered that introducing a constitutional complaint 
mechanism, with aims to challenge actions and decisions of the government, 
would reduce the authority of state officials and public authorities to act and 
make decisions, or create policies. Fourth, the MPR also believed the Court would 
be burdened with too many cases if it held authority to examine constitutional 
complaint cases, as compared to other countries with a similar mechanism. 
Fifth, the MPR concerned that giving a constitutional complaint power to the 
Constitutional Court will lead a potential conflict of jurisdiction with other 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court.
Now, more than twelve years after the establishment of the Constitutional 
Court, I am of the opinion that the MPR’s reasons in rejecting constitutional 
complaint are no longer relevant. A constitutional complaint mechanism might 
be adopted in the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia that upholds 
strong principles of constitutionalism and places the Constitution as the supreme 
law of the land.26 In realising such principles, Indonesia has committed to 
implementing a system of constitutional government. One of the major elements 
derived from a constitutional government system is protection of fundamental 
rights of citizens, as explicitly contained in Chapter XA of the constitutional bill 
of rights in the Indonesian Constitution.27 However, the inclusion of fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution is certainly not enough. It needs a reliable 
mechanism to protect, adhere to and enforce those rights.
Currently, Indonesia only provides limited protection for citizens who feel 
their fundamental rights have been violated. Only the Constitutional Court can 
directly examine a case of constitutional rights violation of individuals, yet it is 
limited to reviewing the constitutionality of laws. Given that the violations of 
constitutional rights not only occur because of the substance of national laws, 
but also because of actions or decisions taken by public authorities or state 
26  Article 1 para (2) of the Indonesian Constitution states, ‘Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is implemented according 
to the Constitution.’ Moreover, Article 1 (3) states, ‘The state of Indonesia is a law state.’
27  Article 28 to 28J of the Indonesian Constitution.
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institutions, the absence of a constitutional mechanism that can protect the 
constitutional right of Indonesian citizens is tantamount to negating an essential 
element in implementing the system of constitutional government. Therefore, 
adopting a constitutional complaint mechanism is imperative to strengthen 
the implementation of the constitutional government system, particularly in 
providing full protection of citizen’s constitutional rights.
The need for establishing a constitutional complaint mechanism in Indonesia 
can also be seen in many cases lodged with the Constitutional Court that have 
similar characteristics to constitutional complaint cases.28 The Court Registration 
Division, without any trial, rejected most of those cases because the applications 
were assessed to be beyond the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.29 However, 
there were also several cases examined by the constitutional justices through court 
hearings, even though these cases, in substance, were constitutional complaint 
cases. This practice frequently occurs when petitioners modify a constitutional 
complaint application so that it becomes a case of constitutional review or 
dispute between state institutions. These cases can be categorised as ‘pseudo-
constitutional complaint’. As a result, many legal arguments constructed by the 
applicants use concrete cases, whereas the doctrine held by the Constitutional 
Court in reviewing the constitutionality of laws is abstract.
Furthermore, some of Constitutional Justices delivered dissenting opinions 
in a constitutional review case where they argued that constitutional complaint 
cases should be examined and decided by the Constitutional Court. Justice 
Siahaan wrote, ‘Therefore, there are reasons to assess from the angle of individual 
constitutional complaint that actually has a sufficient legal basis based on the 
28  Applications and letters received by the Court Registrar in 2005 or two years after the Court establishment showed that there 
were at least 48 petitions that had similar characteristics of constitutional complaint cases. This amount was equivalent to three 
times of judicial review applications in the same year. In its development, there have been approximately 106 petitions regarding 
constitutional complaint applications in 2010. See Pan Mohamad Faiz, ‘Menabur Benih Constitutional Complaint’ [Sowing the Seeds 
of Constitutional Complaint] <http://panmohamadfaiz.com/2006/02/28/constitutional-complaint>; and Hamdan Zoelva, above n 
23, 54. 
29  In this context, Palguna suggested several case examples, such as Constitutional Court Case Number 016/PUU-I/2003 concern-
ing the cancellation of Supreme Court decision on Reconsideration (Peninjauan Kembali); Constitutional Court Case Number 007/
PUU-IV/2006  concerning the uncertainty of court process in an ordinary court and the allegations of bribery; Constitutional Court 
Case Number 030/PUU-IV/2006 concerning the authority to issue broadcasting licenses; and Constitutional Court Case Number 
1/SKLN-VI/2008 concerning the findings of violations in local elections. See Palguna, Pengaduan Konstitusional..., op. cit., p. 4.
A Prospect and Challenges for Adopting Constitutional Complaint and
Constitutional Question in the Indonesian Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, May 2016, Volume 2, Number 1112
principles contained in the 1945 Constitution.’30 Thus, if Indonesia has a strong 
commitment to implementing the principles of constitutional government, 
a constitutional complaint mechanism is very appropriate for protecting the 
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. There are few 
alternative measures that afford such protection, as detailed below. 
First, the most ideal way to adopt the constitutional complaint is to amend 
the Constitution by explicitly adding a constitutional complaint mechanism as 
one of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. In this manner, constitutional and 
political legitimacy would be achieved by giving the constitutional complaint 
mechanism the highest place in the constitutional system in Indonesia. In this 
context, Indonesian can learn from the Turkish Constitutional Court. Turkey 
amended their Constitution in 2010 to incorporate constitutional complaint as 
the newest jurisdiction of the Turkish Constitutional Court. As a result, they 
began receiving individual applications on 23 September 2012.31
Second, the establishment of constitutional complaint mechanism can be 
conducted by revising the Constitutional Court Law through a legislative review 
process. Legislators could expand the meaning of constitutionality of laws that are 
not only limited to laws made by the DPR, but also to the entire laws, regulations, 
actions and decisions made by public authorities and state institutions.32
Third, if the first and second measures are too difficult, the Constitutional 
Court can make a constitutional interpretation by building a legal construction 
where a constitutional complaint is a part of the constitutional review system.33 
Thus, the Constitutional Court would have the power to hear and examine 
constitutional complaint cases, although it would lack legitimacy. In addition, 
the Court would be sharply criticised for practicing excessive judicial activism.
Furthermore, if the constitutional complaint is to be adopted into the 
system of fundamental rights protection in Indonesia, the improvement of 
30  See Constitutional Court Decision No. 001/PUU-IV/2006, reviewing the Supreme Court’s Decision No. 01 PK/Pilkada/2005 concerning 
Regional Head Election in Depok (Judicial Review on Depok Election (2006) case).
31  See Burhan Üstün, “Protection of Human Rights by the Turkish Constitutional Court”, a paper presented at the International 
Conference on the Role of Constitutional Justice in Protecting the Values of the Rule of Law, the Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Moldova, Chişinău, 8 September 2014.
32  See Palguna, Pengaduan Konstitusional..., op. cit.
33  See Faiz, op. cit.
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the institutional structure of the Constitutional Court is a must. Additionally, 
limitations placed on constitutional complaint cases that can be examined by the 
Constitutional Court should be regulated. The experiences of other countries show 
that most cases examined by the constitutional courts have been constitutional 
complaints. 
For instance, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany received 200,482 
(98%) constitutional complaints since 1951. This means that they receive 
around 5,000 constitutional complaint cases each year. This is only 2.5% of 
all constitutional complaint cases granted by the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany. In 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany received 
6,238 constitutional complaint cases, but only 91 cases (1,46%) were granted.34 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court of South Korea received 26,006 constitutional 
complaint cases since it was founded in 1988. In other words, the Constitutional 
Court of South Korea receives about 1,000 constitutional complaint cases 
annually.35 A similar condition is also faced by the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation. The Court received more than 20,000 cases which more 
than 90% of those cases are related to constitutional complaints of its citizens.36 
Additionally, the Constitutional Court of Turkey received more than 45,000 
individual application cases since constitutional complaint was implemented on 
23 September 2012. The backlog is tremendously high. At the time of writing, the 
numbers of pending cases are roughly 20,000.37 More than 85% of constitutional 
complaint cases handled by the Constitutional Court of Turkey are related to 
right to fair trial.38
In contrast, the Indonesian Constitutional Court only received 1,708 cases 
over the past twelve years. In addition, 52% of the total cases handled by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court were related to disputes over election results, both 
34  See The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Annual Statistics 2013, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Downloads/EN/Statistik/statistics_2013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1, accessed 10 March 2016.
35  See The Constitutional Court of Korea, Caseload Statistics, www.http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/ index.do, accessed 10 
March 2016.
36  Kleandrov, op. cit., p. 222.
37  See The Constitutional Court of Turkey, Individual Application Statistics, http://anayasa.gov.tr/en/inlinepages/IndividualApplication/
Statistics.html, accessed 10 March 2016.
38  Zühtü Arslan, “Constitutional Complaint as an Instrument for Protecting Basic Rights: The Case of Turkey” in M. Guntur Hamzah et 
al. (eds), Proceeding of International Symposium on Constitutional Complaint, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 
2015, pp. 174-175.
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at the national and the regional level.39 Although the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court received fewer cases than other constitutional courts, the Court still felt 
overwhelmed in resolving those cases. Therefore, several prerequisites must be 
considered if a constitutional complaint mechanism is to be adapted to the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court.
First, the organisational structure of the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
should be strengthened, particularly by increasing the number of skilled and 
experienced constitutional researchers and law clerks in order to support the 
constitutional justices in examining cases and making decisions. At the time 
of writing, the Indonesian Constitutional Court only has 19 researchers and 15 
law clerks whose their average age is 36 years. With the current organisational 
structure, the Court will definitely face difficulty in handling constitutional 
complaint cases. Therefore, in the future, the structure and various programs 
of the Indonesian Constitutional Court should focus more on the management 
of case settlement as its primary function.
Source: Human Resources and Finance Bureau of the Indonesian Constitutional Court
39  See The Constitutional Court of Indonesia, Case Recapitulation, www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id, accessed 10 March 2016.
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In this context, Indonesia can learn from Turkey’s experiences. The 2010 
Turkish constitutional amendment introduced the individual complaint system 
and restructured the Constitutional Court organisation. For instance, before 
the Constitutional amendment, they only had 11 Constitutional Justices and 
20 Rapporteur Judges assisting the Court. After the amendment, the number 
increased to 17 Constitutional Justices, 77 Rapporteur Judges and 25 Assistant 
Rapporteur Judges. Previously, the Court exercised constitutional review in plenary 
session, but now two Sections were established for the purpose of handling 
constitutional complaint. In addition, three Commissions were also established 
under each section and the administrative bureau was strengthened.40
Second, the Constitutional Court should be given an authority of the dismissal 
process conducted by a panel of justices, not by registrars or administrative 
officers, to sort out whether a case can be examined further in court hearings 
or should be dismissed directly. This filtering mechanism is needed to ensure 
the Constitutional Court handles caseloads properly.
Third, the Constitutional Court should make clear boundaries regarding 
constitutional complaint cases that can be examined. Some of the main limitations 
are: (1) the applicant must be an individual who directly suffered from the loss 
of their constitutional rights; (2) the application can only be submitted after 
it has exhausted all available legal remedies; (3) there must be a time limit 
for applying a constitutional complaint case after a court judgment, actions 
or decisions made by public authorities or state institutions which violate the 
constitutional rights of the applicant. 
In the context of Indonesia, which has a vast territory lacking adequate access 
to transportation, information and communication, the time limit for applying 
a constitutional complaint case should be regulated for at least three months 
starting from the exhaustion of legal remedies. The comparison concerning the 
time limit for constitutional complaint submission in various countries can be 
seen in the following figure.
40  Email from Mucahit Aydin (A Rapporteur Judge of the Constitutional Court of Turkey) to Pan Mohamad Faiz Kusuma Wijaya, 6 
October 2015.
A Prospect and Challenges for Adopting Constitutional Complaint and
Constitutional Question in the Indonesian Constitutional Court
Constitutional Review, May 2016, Volume 2, Number 1116
Figure 3
Table of Comparison on Constitutional Complaint Application
Country Time Limit Legal Basis
Austria six weeks Article 82 ofthe Constitutional Court Law
Croatia 30 days Article 64 ofthe Constitutional Court Law
Hungary 60 days Article 28 ofthe Constitutional Court Law
Germany one month
Article 93(1) of
the Federal Constitutional Court 
Law
South Korea 90 days Article 68(1) ofthe Constitutional Court Law
Spain 30 days Article 44(2) ofthe Constitutional Court Law
Turkey 30 days Article 47 of theConstitutional Court Law
Source: Compiled by the author
B. Constitutional Question
In addition to constitutional complaint, another jurisdiction that might be 
adopted by the Indonesian Constitutional Court is the constitutional question. 
It is a mechanism that allows ordinary judges to review the constitutionality of 
laws or regulations being used to decide cases in ordinary courts. If judges are 
unsure or doubtful about the constitutionality of laws or regulations being used 
for examining their cases, they may delay the examination and question the 
Constitutional Court. In this matter, the Constitutional Court will only decide 
the constitutionality of the law or regulation in question. The ordinary judges 
will then determine the case based on the Constitutional Court’s decision.41 
While this mechanism has not been recognised in the Indonesian constitutional 
41  Victor Ferreres Comella, “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward decentralization?”, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 2, Issue 3, July 2004, p. 465.
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adjudication system, in many countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Luxemburg, South Korea and Spain, the constitutional question has been 
implemented.42
In Indonesia, litigants in ordinary courts file applications for constitutional 
review to the Constitutional Court by themselves without any assistance or 
coordination from the ordinary courts. For instance, this practice occurred in the 
Leste Majeste (2006) case. Eggi Sudjana, a political activist, who is also a popular 
lawyer, was charged, based on Article 134, Article 136 bis and Article 137 of the 
Indonesian Criminal Code, with insulting the president, known as the Leste 
Majeste. On his initiative, Sudjana lodged a constitutional review application 
with the Constitutional Court against those articles. The Constitutional Court 
annulled the articles as they proved to be contrary to the Constitution.43 
Although the Court annulled it, the ordinary court still sentenced him to 
three months in prison and probation for six months.44 The legal reason given by 
the ordinary court was that the action committed by Sudjana occurred before the 
Constitutional Court declared its decision. According to the judges who decided 
the case, the effect of Constitutional Court’s decision was not retroactive and 
only applied prospectively. In addition, the Supreme Court strengthened the 
lower court’s decision.45 Based on this case, the decision of the ordinary court or 
the Supreme Court would be different if the ordinary court held authority, or at 
least had an initiative, to apply a constitutional question to the Constitutional 
Court. Thus, the constitutional rights of citizens would be protected.
The constitutional question mechanism offers several advantages for the 
constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. First, the constitutional question 
can strengthen the protection, respect and fulfilment of constitutional rights of 
citizens. Thus, if there are citizens who lack awareness or the ability to defend 
42  Ibid.
43  Constitutional Court Decision No. 013-022/PUU-IV/2006, reviewing Law No. 8 of 1981 on Indonesian Criminal Code. See also 
Naomita Royan, “Increasing Press Freedom in Indonesia: the Abolition of the Lese Majeste and ‘Hate-Sowing’ Provisions”, Aus-
tralian Journal of Asian Law, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 290-311.
44  Hukum Online, “Eggy Divonis 3 Bulan Penjara [Eggy was sentenced to three months in prison]”, 22 February 2007, http://www.
hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol16258/eggy-divonis-3-bulan-penjara, accessed 15 March 2016.
45  Hukum Online, “Eggi Sudjana Ajukan PK Perkara Penghinaan Presiden [Eggi Sudjana filed a reconsideration of case for insulting 
the insulting the President]”, 2 July 2010, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/ lt4c2d0148deb5e/eggi-sudjana-ajukan-pk-
perkara-penghinaan-presiden, accessed 15 March 2016.
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their constitutional rights, they will still receive the minimum protection of 
constitutional rights without having to actively apply for a constitutional review 
case to the Constitutional Court. 
Nonetheless, the submission of the constitutional question to the 
Constitutional Court remains highly dependent on the initiative and willingness 
of ordinary judges. Second, ordinary judges will no longer be forced to use the 
applicable laws or regulations in examining a case if they doubt that it has 
potential conflict with the Constitution. Third, the presence of the constitutional 
question will help to achieve a common understanding among ordinary judges 
of the importance in upholding the principles of the constitutionality of laws 
and regulations. If the mechanism of the constitutional question is adopted in 
Indonesia, the ordinary judges could be more critical of the constitutionality of 
laws and regulations.46 
Four options exist for the adoption of the constitutional question by the 
constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. First, the best way to expand 
the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is by adding the constitutional question 
as an additional power to the Court through a constitutional amendment. The 
main advantage in using this method is that there will be a strong constitutional 
basis for the Court to examine cases concerning constitutional questions. 
Second, the Constitutional Court Law could be revised by adding provisions 
that provide flexibility for ordinary judges to submit a constitutional complaint 
to the Constitutional Court. These provisions would be included in a specific 
chapter on constitutional review in the Constitutional Court Law, with an 
interpretation that the constitutional question is one of the constitutional review 
types provided by the Constitution.47 Thus, the constitutional question would be 
part of constitutional adjudication under the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.
Third, another option is to follow the mechanism adopted in the French 
system known as the exception d ‘inconstitutionnalité. In this system, if there 
46  See also I Dewa Gede Palguna, “Constitutional Question: Latar Belakang dan Praktik di Negara Lain serta Kemungkinan Penerapan-
nya di Indonesia [Constitutional Question: Background and Practice in Other Countries and the Possibility of Its Implementation 
in Indonesia]”, Jurnal Hukum, Volume 17, Number 1, January 2010, pp. 16-17.
47  Ibid 16.
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is a judge in lower courts who have questions on the constitutionality of laws, 
they can ask the Constitutional Court. However, the application should be sent 
to and examined first by the Conseil d ‘État or the Cour de Cassation prior to 
the submission to the Constitutional Council.48 This system can also be applied 
in Indonesia without amending the Constitution or revising the Constitutional 
Court Law. According to the Constitutional Court Law, a state institution can 
apply for constitutional review.49 The definition of state institutions here includes 
the Supreme Court.50 
Thus, if there is a constitutional question requested by ordinary judges in 
Indonesia, the application should be submitted to the Supreme Court. Using the 
constitutional review mechanism, the Supreme Court can lodge a constitutional 
question to the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, this French system has 
a weakness if the Supreme Court does not follow up the request submitted 
by ordinary judges to the Constitutional Court. To prevent this deadlock, the 
Supreme Court has to create an internal regulation concerning the mechanism 
and procedure to request a constitutional question. This regulation provides 
assurance and certainty that the request will be submitted to the Constitutional 
Court if it meets the requirements. This guarantee is necessary so that ordinary 
judges will not hesitate or worry that the Supreme Court will dismiss their 
constitutional questions without adequate reasons.
Fourth, the Constitutional Court can make a constitutional interpretation 
that the definition of state institutions in constitutional review system includes 
general courts, consisting of public courts, religious courts, military courts 
and administrative courts. Thus, the constitutional interpretation made by the 
Constitutional Court will become a key to introducing a constitutional question 
48 Federico Fabbrini, “Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of a Posteriori Constitutional Review of 
Legislation”, German Law Journal, Volume 9, Number 10, 2008, p. 1306; Myriam Hunter-Henin, “Constitutional Developments and 
Human Rights in France: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 
1, January 2011, p. 187.
49 See Article 51(1)(d) of the Constitutional Court Law. There was a case filed by 31 Justices from the Supreme Court for reviewing 
the constitutionality of Judicial Commission’s power for monitoring and supervising the behaviours of Justices both in the Supreme 
Court. See Constitutional Court Decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006, reviewing Law No. 22 of 2004 on Judicial Commission (Judicial 
Commission (2006) case).
50  The only thing prohibited for the Supreme Court according to the Constitutional Court Law is that they become a party to the 
dispute over the authorities of state institutions. See Article 65 of the Constitutional Court Law and Article 2(3) of the Constitutional 
Court Regulation No. 08 of 2006 on Guidelines for Litigation in Dispute on Constitutional Authorities between State Institutions.
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mechanism that can be used by ordinary judges. In addition, the procedures 
and requirements will be similar to the process of constitutional review of laws, 
except the Court creates new court regulation concerning special procedures and 
requirements for a constitutional question.
The four options explained above offer alternatives for adopting the 
constitutional question into the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. 
However, there is also a serious challenge that has to be overcome before the 
constitutional question can be adopted. The length of time in deciding a 
constitutional question case by the Constitutional Court should be an important 
concern. In some countries that have implemented this mechanism, the length 
of time in deciding a constitutional question case has become an obstacle for 
the ordinary courts in making their final decision. 
In this context, Comella compared constitutional court hearings concerning 
constitutional question cases in European countries. He found that the length of 
time in deciding a constitutional question case varies. Luxemburg can resolve a 
constitutional question case in just a few months; while in Austria and Belgium 
it may take up to one year. In addition, Italy takes one to two years for deciding 
a constitutional question case. Surprisingly, Germany and Spain has taken five 
to eight years to decide constitutional question cases.51 Thus, the time limit for 
deciding a constitutional question case must be regulated based on the ability of 
the Constitutional Court in handling a case, either in the Constitutional Court 
Law or the Constitutional Court Regulation.52
III. CONCLUSION
This artile has analysed current challenges faced by the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court due to its limited jurisdiction. Without constitutional 
complaint and constitutional question jurisdiction, the Court cannot optimally 
safeguard the Constitution, particularly in protecting fundamental rights of 
51  Comella, “The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward decentralization?”, op. cit., p.  471.
52  Article 86 of the Constitutional Court Law authorises the Constitutional Court to regulate further any shortcoming or absence of 
procedural law to support the implementation of its duties and responsibilities.
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citizens. Thus, some developments related to its jurisdiction should be improved. 
The constitutional complaint and the constitutional complaint mechanism need 
to be adapted to the Indonesian Constitutional Court. 
The most ideal way to add these jurisdictions to the Constitutional Court is 
by amending the Constitution. Thus, when the Constitutional Court exercises the 
jurisdictions there will be a strong basis and constitutional legitimacy. The main 
problems that will be faced when the Constitutional Court adopts these new 
jurisdictions are the number of cases that will increase sharply and the time limit 
for decising cases. Therefore, a filtering mechanism of constitutional complaint 
cases needs to be established. In addition, the institutional structure, human 
resources and decision-making process have to be strengthened. Otherwise, the 
Court will be overwhelmed in receiving cases concerning constitutional complaint 
and constitutional question.
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